There might be more room in Mill for some conservatism. Consider this passage, from On Liberty:
"In the conduct of human beings towards one another, it is necessary that general rules should for the most part be observed, in order that people may know what they have to expect; but in each person's own concerns, his individual spontaneity is entitled to free exercise."
The phrase "for the most part" is quite strong, esp. in the context of that book, and gets overlooked. Mill isn't looking to overturn Burke, as such, but to overturn the "despotism of custom" that he saw around him in Victorian society. Juts think of Darwin, who published in the same year as OL...
Mill also writes this:
"it would be absurd to pretend that people ought to live as if nothing whatever had been known in the world before they came into it; as if experience had as yet done nothing towards showing that one mode of existence, or of conduct, is preferable to another. Nobody denies that people should be so taught and trained in youth, as to know and benefit by the ascertained results of human experience. But it is the privilege and proper condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his own way."
This is not anti-Burke, on my reading, but perhaps reconcilable. Mill himself was a strong believer in the importance of studying the ancient world, and of knowing history. And he was a mix of conventional and unconventional in his personal life, in a way that doesn't easily fit these categories. One way of summarising Mill's views is to say that he placed so much importance on education because without it you are beholden to custom, but with it you can take a sensible, discriminating view of the role custom plays.
Maybe Mill thinks that part of the evidence you use when making a reasoned choice about how to live is evidence about how various forms of life (or "experiments in living") have worked out for those who take them up. Whether this reconciles him and Burke may depend on how "opaque" (Henrich's word) the benefits of customary ways of living are. If they are quite opaque, then it's unclear that experience has "shown that one mode of existence is preferable" in a way we can appreciate or use to make an informed decision. In one sense experience had shown then Tukanoans that their traditional way of cooking manioc is preferable, but someone looking at it and comparing it to a hypothetical alternative would not be able to tell it was preferable (without a detailed knowledge of chemistry, and performing a bunch of tests).
Lots of Burkeans told Mill something like that about feminism and democracy! And he shared some of the concerns about democracy. I think it's a question of the methods they think are suitable to evolving customs and the relevance of their arguments to their times.
(1) I don't know whether it's the "more to be said" that you're looking for, but there's the conservative principle teaching that the burden of proof in public deliberation is on those who would change things. It's sort of like how sport treats instant replay: a call may be overruled only if there's strong evidence it was wrong.
(2) There's another sort of conservative epistemic argument in the vicinity. It goes something like this:
One thing that marks the difference between the conservative sensibility and the progressive one is this: about a possible change to an existing arrangement the conservative tends to ask "What will we lose?" while the progressive tends to ask "What will we gain?" The former question is on stronger epistemic footing than the latter, since while we have before us now all the concrete things we could lose, we have nothing concrete before us now that we are said to possibly gain. The conservative can refer to concrete, present things that are possibly lost; the progressive can appeal to abstract, currently absent things that are possibly gained. We can be intimately familiar with those things that might be lost; we cannot be at all familiar with those things that might be gained.
One version of conservatism (maybe in Oakeshott sometimes) is a preference for a valuable thing one already has, over a different valuable thing one might exchange for it, even if the new thing is, and is known to be, equally, or more valuable. That's not motivated by skepticism. The strand of Burke I was looking at (I think there are many others) was so motivated, and (it seems) would be okay with making the switch, if only there were some authority that could made assurances that it was indeed for the better. (I'm not sure you disagree with any of this.) The question then, if that is right, is what we are to do, absent such assurances. You, I think, want to build on "try for improvements, but be careful" with: "be careful" means put the burden of proof on the advocate for change.
G. A. Cohen's "A Truth in Conservatism: Rescuing Conservatism from the Conservatives" contains something like the maybe-Oakeshottian value-preference argument. I'm sure you've read it, but just in case, I thought I'd mention it . . . .
Let me say: I really appreciate this post, and I don't doubt it will continue to be valuable to me. My conservative taste, such as it is, is always at war with my nagging thought that things could be better (including a better respect for the conservative sensibility!). So it's salutary, for me, anyway, to see someone working through a conservative line of thought out loud and in such detail, and comparing it to a more non-conservative line of thought. This was just an outstanding little essay.
At least in terms of the argument here, chimps are liberals and humans are Burkeans, at least regarding the experiment in which the experimenter taught young chimps and toddlers to perform a task but with an obviously pointless step interpolated into a process. The toddlers were the uncritical ones, following their teacher. The chimps showed little regard for authority and took the shortcut. The link is here.
There might be more room in Mill for some conservatism. Consider this passage, from On Liberty:
"In the conduct of human beings towards one another, it is necessary that general rules should for the most part be observed, in order that people may know what they have to expect; but in each person's own concerns, his individual spontaneity is entitled to free exercise."
The phrase "for the most part" is quite strong, esp. in the context of that book, and gets overlooked. Mill isn't looking to overturn Burke, as such, but to overturn the "despotism of custom" that he saw around him in Victorian society. Juts think of Darwin, who published in the same year as OL...
Mill also writes this:
"it would be absurd to pretend that people ought to live as if nothing whatever had been known in the world before they came into it; as if experience had as yet done nothing towards showing that one mode of existence, or of conduct, is preferable to another. Nobody denies that people should be so taught and trained in youth, as to know and benefit by the ascertained results of human experience. But it is the privilege and proper condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his own way."
This is not anti-Burke, on my reading, but perhaps reconcilable. Mill himself was a strong believer in the importance of studying the ancient world, and of knowing history. And he was a mix of conventional and unconventional in his personal life, in a way that doesn't easily fit these categories. One way of summarising Mill's views is to say that he placed so much importance on education because without it you are beholden to custom, but with it you can take a sensible, discriminating view of the role custom plays.
Would Burke disagree with that I wonder?
Maybe Mill thinks that part of the evidence you use when making a reasoned choice about how to live is evidence about how various forms of life (or "experiments in living") have worked out for those who take them up. Whether this reconciles him and Burke may depend on how "opaque" (Henrich's word) the benefits of customary ways of living are. If they are quite opaque, then it's unclear that experience has "shown that one mode of existence is preferable" in a way we can appreciate or use to make an informed decision. In one sense experience had shown then Tukanoans that their traditional way of cooking manioc is preferable, but someone looking at it and comparing it to a hypothetical alternative would not be able to tell it was preferable (without a detailed knowledge of chemistry, and performing a bunch of tests).
Lots of Burkeans told Mill something like that about feminism and democracy! And he shared some of the concerns about democracy. I think it's a question of the methods they think are suitable to evolving customs and the relevance of their arguments to their times.
(1) I don't know whether it's the "more to be said" that you're looking for, but there's the conservative principle teaching that the burden of proof in public deliberation is on those who would change things. It's sort of like how sport treats instant replay: a call may be overruled only if there's strong evidence it was wrong.
(2) There's another sort of conservative epistemic argument in the vicinity. It goes something like this:
One thing that marks the difference between the conservative sensibility and the progressive one is this: about a possible change to an existing arrangement the conservative tends to ask "What will we lose?" while the progressive tends to ask "What will we gain?" The former question is on stronger epistemic footing than the latter, since while we have before us now all the concrete things we could lose, we have nothing concrete before us now that we are said to possibly gain. The conservative can refer to concrete, present things that are possibly lost; the progressive can appeal to abstract, currently absent things that are possibly gained. We can be intimately familiar with those things that might be lost; we cannot be at all familiar with those things that might be gained.
One version of conservatism (maybe in Oakeshott sometimes) is a preference for a valuable thing one already has, over a different valuable thing one might exchange for it, even if the new thing is, and is known to be, equally, or more valuable. That's not motivated by skepticism. The strand of Burke I was looking at (I think there are many others) was so motivated, and (it seems) would be okay with making the switch, if only there were some authority that could made assurances that it was indeed for the better. (I'm not sure you disagree with any of this.) The question then, if that is right, is what we are to do, absent such assurances. You, I think, want to build on "try for improvements, but be careful" with: "be careful" means put the burden of proof on the advocate for change.
That situates my comment nicely. Thank you.
G. A. Cohen's "A Truth in Conservatism: Rescuing Conservatism from the Conservatives" contains something like the maybe-Oakeshottian value-preference argument. I'm sure you've read it, but just in case, I thought I'd mention it . . . .
Let me say: I really appreciate this post, and I don't doubt it will continue to be valuable to me. My conservative taste, such as it is, is always at war with my nagging thought that things could be better (including a better respect for the conservative sensibility!). So it's salutary, for me, anyway, to see someone working through a conservative line of thought out loud and in such detail, and comparing it to a more non-conservative line of thought. This was just an outstanding little essay.
Thanks!
I've seen that Cohen paper mentioned but really should read it for myself.
At least in terms of the argument here, chimps are liberals and humans are Burkeans, at least regarding the experiment in which the experimenter taught young chimps and toddlers to perform a task but with an obviously pointless step interpolated into a process. The toddlers were the uncritical ones, following their teacher. The chimps showed little regard for authority and took the shortcut. The link is here.
https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1993-44247-001