Justifying the Family, 1

Art by Elliot Skow

In Family Values, Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift ask whether children need parents. That inquiry seems a wild project, but then philosophers are supposed to question everything and follow the argument where it leads. Why not raise children another way, say

* In “state-regulated quasi-orphanages,” where “children are raised by trained...employees”;

or

* In kibbutzim, where “child raising is shared between ‘parents’ and designated child-raising specialists...children would have contact with their ‘parents’ for about three hours a day”;

or

* In communes, where “a large group of adults collectively...raises a group of children, with no adult thinking of herself as having any special responsibility for any particular child, and no child thinking of herself as the responsibility of any particular adult.”

Stay calm; Brighouse and Swift defend the status quo. Before evaluating their case, it’s worth observing that things go off the rails before the arguments begin. BnS assert, of these alternatives, that in none of them “would children have parents.” That’s quite wrong. Children raised in state-run orphanages, or in communes, would certainly have parents—they just would not know their parents. The horror of these arrangements, therefore, is not that no child would have parents; it’s the greater horror, that children would be lost to their parents, and their parents made alien to them.

BnS argue that families are better because they better serve children’s interests. Describing those interests, BnS say that (this is an abbreviated list):

• Children need food, shelter, clothing, etc.

• Children need education.

• Children have emotional needs, and need to learn to regulate their emotional lives.

• Children need the freedom and support to enjoy their childhood.

The full argument for families is long, but here is part of their case that communes serve these interests less well: